The use of signcryption for secure and authenticated data communication was realized in 1997, following which numerous signcryptions have been presented which are provably secure in the random oracle proof methodology. In this paper, we present an identity-based signcryption provably secure in the standard model. Our scheme relies on the intractability of two well studied problems, the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the computational Diffie-Hellman. We achieve the security reduction of our scheme for the properties message confidentiality and unforgeability without relying on random oracles.
INTRODUCTION
A generic approach to achieve message authentication and confidentiality is by signing and encrypting the message sequentially. Apparently, this generic approach is a part of folkfore and commonly used by practioners. Initially, this way of achieving both authenticity and confidentiality was presented by Stallings (Stallings, 1999 ) with respect to symmetric key cryptography. In public key context, Zheng proposed a new primitive known as signcryption to achieve message confidentiality and authenticity simultaneously at a (computational and communicational) cost less than the generic approach (Zheng, 1997) . Since the revival of identity-based cryptography in 2001 several identity-based signcryptions have been proposed. In this paper, we present an identitybased signcryption in the standard model.
The importance of security proof was realized in the early 90's. Since then a cryptographic scheme and its property is evaluated based on the proof outlining the reduction of the scheme to its underlying mathematical hard problem. Most of the identity-based signcryptions defined in the literature (Libert and Quisquater, 2003; McCullagh and Barreto, 2004; Libert and Quisquater, 2004; Malone-Lee, 2002; Chen and Malone-Lee, 2004; Yuen and Wei, 2004; Boyen, 2003; Barreto et al., 2005) are proved secure in a practice oriented proof methodology introduced by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993. This proving technique is known as the "Random Oracle Model" (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) . Although a stronger proof model namely the "Standard Model" was known to the community, efficient schemes in the standard model were not constructed due to the difficulty in presenting the security reduction.
Identity-based Encryption in Standard Model.
The first efficient identity-based encryption provably secure without random oracles was defined by Boneh and Boyen (Boneh and Boyen, 2004) in 2004. Although the scheme was proved secure in a slightly weaker notion in which an adversary has to commit to a public identity (challenge identity used in the attack game) in advance. Following the result of Boneh and Boyen, Waters defined the first identity-based encryption which is fully secure without random oracles (Waters, 2005) . His work was inspired by the hierarchical encryption scheme presented by Boneh and Boyen (Boneh-Boyen presented two encryption schemes in (Boneh and Boyen, 2004) ). The way identity is mapped to a public key in Waters encryption scheme is based on a collison-resistant function given by Boneh and Boyen in (Boneh and Boyen, 2004) . The Waters scheme is based on strong, well-studied problem namely decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman. Recently, a practical identity-based encryption in the standard model with compact public parameter length was presented in the paper (Gentry, 2006) . But, the scheme is based on a strong assumption known as augumented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent problem.
Identity-based Signature in Standard Model.
One can construct simple IBS schemes by using ordinary signature scheme in the standard model by attaching a certificate containing the public key of the signer. Many such simple schemes have been mentioned in the literature, for example see (Gentry and Silverberg, 2002; Kiltz et al., 2005; Dodis et al., 2003) . However these signatures have disadvantages from two counts: they are computationally expensive (two sign verifications) and secondly, they have a large signature space (need to include the public key of the signer and two signatures (one by the signer and the other by the certifier)). The first direct construction of efficient ID-based signature in the standard model was presented by Paterson and Schuldt (Paterson and Schuldt, 2006) . The signature is based on the hierarchical extension of Waters encryption scheme (Waters, 2005) . This methodology of converting a 2-level hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) to an IBS scheme was first presented by Gentry and Silverberg (Gentry and Silverberg, 2002) .
Identity-based Signcryption in Standard Model.
The construction of signcryption primitive poses two main problems. Firstly, the computational and space complexities of the primitive should be smaller than the combined complexities of encryption and signature. The space complexity is mainly responsible for the runtime communication cost which includes the amount of signcrypted data from a sender to a receiver. Secondly, the signcryption should admit formal proofs in strong security model. We describe such a strong model in Section 3.
In 2005, Yuen and Wei (Yuen and Wei, 2005) presented the first hierarchical signcryption in the standard model as an extension of their hierarchical signature construction. The security of their scheme is based on weaker notion called sample identity. This notion is weaker than the selective identity model, where the challenge identity is chosen by the adversary before the start of the game. The signcryption requires 7 pairings (1 pre-computable) and 9 exponentiations. Our goal is to present an efficient identitybased signcryption which is provably secure in the standard model where adversary can change challenge identity adaptively.
Signcryption is primarily useful in applications where secure and authenticated data transmission is necessary at a low computational and communicational cost. Another application where signcryptions are useful is in the area of key establishment protocols. In key establishment protocols authenticity and confidentiality need to be simultaneously satisfied for the exchanged keys and hence the signcryption meets this requirement perfectly. A basic signcryption is equivalent to a one-pass key exchange if the message block is viewed as the session key exchanged between the users. An interesting observation from (Gorantla et al., 2007) states that the security notions of the signcryption can be extended to key establishment protocols. The security of key exchange protocols is based on the indistinguishability of the keys by an adversary and this notion is analogous to the indistinguishability of ciphertext notion used in the signcryption security model. The authenticity of the key exchanged follows from the message confidentiality notion of the signcryption.
Our Contributions
Signcryption can be applied in two ways given a message, sign and encrypt the message or encrypt the message and sign. By following the latter approach we achieve public verifiability of the signature and the former way of signcryption results in a non-public verifiable signature. In this paper, we present a public verifiable identity-based signcryption in the standard model. Our construction is based on Waters encryption and our efficient identity-based signature. The security of the signcryption is based on two well studied hard problems namely, the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman and computational Diffie-Hellman. Our scheme is secure in the adaptive security notion defined in the Section 3. The scheme performs better than serially combining any known identity-based encryption and a signature in the standard model. We achieve reduction in the public parameter size, the signcryption size and the number of exponentiations. The efficiency results are presented in Table 1 , Section 4.1. Further, it is to be noted that there is no gain in the number of pairing operations and the size of public parameter is same as in the Waters encryption scheme (Waters, 2005) .
One of the disadvantages of schemes based on Waters hash is that the public parameters space is large. We have been able to reduce the public parameters space by half to that of Paterson-Schuldt scheme (Paterson and Schuldt, 2006) . However, it should be pointed out that the public parameters are acquired only for the initialization of the scheme and does not affect runtime cost of signcrypted data. The initialization requirements can be easily accomplished in a desktop environment and thereby, the practicality of the scheme should not be affected.
Paper Outline
In Section 2, we present the necessary mathematical preliminaries and the related complexity assumptions. The security model for our signcryption is detailed in Section 3, followed by our signcryption construction and its efficiency in Section 4. Section 5 presents a detailed proof of our scheme and finally, Section 6 presents our conclusion.
BACKGROUND
Before we describe the construction of our scheme, we present a brief overview of the notations and other basic mathematical assumptions followed in the paper.
Bilinear Maps
Let G 1 and G 2 be multiplicative groups of prime order q. Let Z * q denote the set of all non-zero integers modulo prime q. A bilinear map is a map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , satisfying the following properties.
-ê is bilinear, i.e. for all g, g 1 , g 2 ∈ G 1 and a, b
. -ê is non-degenerate, i.e. for g ∈ G 1 /1,ê(g, g) = 1.
-ê is efficiently computable.
Admissible Collision-resistant Functions
Our scheme uses collision resistant function of the form {0, 1} n u −→ G 1 , where n u denotes the length of an identity and can constructed as given in (Waters, 2005) . In addition, we use a target collision resistant function of the nature G 2 × G 1 −→ Z * q , this can be constructed using general cryptographic hash functions. To allow identities of arbitrary length, collisionresistant hash function, H 1 : {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} n u can be defined.
Identity-based Signcryption
An identity-based signcryption consists of the following four algorithms.
Set-up. Given a security parameter k, this algorithm
generates the global public parameters params and the master secret. The private key generator keeps the master secret to itself and publishes the global public parameters params. 
Extract. Given a user's identity

Complexity Assumptions
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
Given (g, g a , g b ) ∈ G 1 , where g is a generator of G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * q , the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is to compute g ab .
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem
where g is a generator of G 1 , Y ∈ G 2 and a, b, c ∈ Z * q , the DBDH problem is to determine if Y =ê(g, g) abc .
teste 3 SECURITY NOTIONS FOR SIGNCRYPTION
The signcryption scheme we present is proved under the adaptive identity model for both indistinguishability and existential unforgeability attacks. A brief description of the game in given below.
Indistinguishability of Chosen Ciphertext
Definition 3.0.
We say that an Id-based signcryption scheme (IDSC) has the indistinguishability against adaptive identity chosen ciphertext attack property (IND-IDSC-CCA2), if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following attack game.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup() algorithm of the scheme and sends the global system parameter to the adversary A . -Extract Query: The adversary submits an identity ID to the challenger. The challenger runs the Extract() algorithm and responds with the private key of ID. -Signcrypt Query: The adversary submits a sender identity, receiver identity and message to the challenger. The challenger runs the Signcrypt() algorithm and responds with the signcryption of the message consisting of the signature processed with private key of the sender, and encryption of the given message using public key of the receiver. -Unsigncrypt Query: The adversary submits a sender identity, a receiver identity and a signcrypted text to the challenger. The challenger runs the Unsigncrypt() algorithm and returns the output.
Challenge. Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over, it presents two equal length messages M 0 , M 1 , sender's identity ID * 1 and a recipient identity ID * 2 on which it wishes to be challenged for which adversary did not ask the private key. The challenger chooses a random bit b and computes the signcryption of the message M b and sends the signcrypted message to the adversary. 
NEW IDENTITY-BASED SIGNCRYPTION (IDSC) CONSTRUCTION
In this section, a new signcryption construction based on an efficient signature construction is presented.
Setup.
The private key generator (PKG) chooses groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order q such that a bilinear mapê : G 1 × G 1 −→ G 2 can be constructed and picks a generator g of G 1 . The PKG then selects a secret s ∈ Z * q randomly, computes g 1 = g s and picks g 2 ∈ R G 1 . Further, PKG chooses u ′ , u ′ m ∈ R G 1 and a vector → U= (u i ) of length n u whose entries are random elements from G 1 .
Given an identity u, V ⊆ {1, .....n u } denotes the set of all i's such that u[i] = 1, where u[i] is the ith bit of the identity string. The public key g u is calculated as given below. 
IDENTITY-BASED SIGNCRYPTION WITHOUT RANDOM ORACLES
is the jth bit of the message string. Table 1 gives a comparison of the computations involved in our IDSC with respect to a generic signcryption derivable using Waters encryption (Waters, 2005) and the signature presented by Paterson and Schuldt (Paterson and Schuldt, 2006) . In addition to the computations, the signcryption size and the public parameter size are mentioned. In case of the ciphertext space, there is a reduction of one element over G 1 . But again, due to the fact that W = g r A +t 1 can be fixed, a user needs to send this value only to a new receiver. This would further reduce the ciphertext space by one element over G 1 . The public parameter size is G 4 1 × G n u 1 . The parameters n u and n m in Table 1 denotes the length of an identity and a message respectively.
Efficiency of IDSC
SECURITY PROOFS
In this section, security results of IDSC against (ε, Q e , Q s )-IND-IDSC-CCA2 and (ε, Q e , Q s )-EUF-IDSC-CMA attacks explained in Section 3 are presented. The proofs will appear in an extended paper.
The use of collision resistant function H m presents the necessity of including the probability of collisions which can affect the output of the attack game. (k)).
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented an efficient and fully secure identity-based signcryption in the standard model. The scheme presented is proved secure in a well-defined adaptive identity chosen ciphertext and chosen message attack security notions. The scheme performs better than sequentially combining any known identity-based encryption and a signature in the standard model. We achieve reduction in the 
